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現代史の殆どの期間、共和国体制のエジプトと南に隣接するスーダンは緊張関
係にあった。それはエジプトとスーダンの支配者の政治志向の違いや、中東･北ア
フリカ（MENA）地域内での対立するブロックとの連携に起因していた。物質的･観
念的および外交的な資源と影響力により、そして自らの政治的目標の追求のため
に、エジプトはスーダンや他のナイル川流域国家の行動を抑制し左右することがで
きていた。それはとりわけエジプトの国家的存在と繁栄が依存するナイル川の水資
源の利用に関わる問題について顕著にみられた。しかしながら中東およびアフリカ
の角における地域的･国内的な変動、とりわけ 2011年以降の同地域の地政的な変
化により、エジプトのスーダンに対する影響力は顕著に後退し、水資源を巡る新た
な政治力学はスーダンをナイル河畔における地政的アクターとして登場させるに
至っている。スーダンはかつてナイル川の水問題ではエジプトの忠実なパートナー
であったが、現在では上流の国家との連携関係やナイル川の水資源の自国での
利用についてより柔軟な立場を主張するようになっている。 
本論は以上のような文脈でエジプト･スーダン関係を歴史的に回顧し、また 2011
年以降の中東およびアフリカの角地域の地政的な変動を概観しようとするものであ
る。エジプトのスーダンおよび他のナイル川流域国家に対する影響力の低下の要
因は、(1)エジプト国内の不安定化および中東地域全体への影響力の低下、(2)同
国の体制維持と国内安定化のために地域の主要国にさらに依存するようになって
いる事、そして(3)同国のナイル川流域における覇権の喪失に拠ることを議論する。 
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Abstract 
 
For most of its contemporary history, republican Egypt has had strained relations with its southern 
neighbor, Sudan, prompted by the contradictory visions of the ruling elites and regime alliances 
with opposing power blocs in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). With a combination of 
material, ideational, and diplomatic resources, and in pursuit of its own goals, Egypt used to contain 
and influence the behavior of Sudan and other Nile River riparian states, particularly over issues 
pertaining to the utilization of the Nile’s waters, on which Egypt’s prosperity and very existence 
depends. However, the regional and domestic transformations in the Middle East and Horn of Africa, 
particularly the changing geopolitical landscape since 2011, undermined Egypt’s influence in 
Sudan and positioned the latter as an influential hydro-political actor in the Nile basin. Once a 
strong and loyal partner to Egypt regarding the Nile water issues, Sudan has increasingly signaled 
a more flexible position on cooperating with the upstream states and harnessing its own water 
resources, away from Egypt. In this context, this article reviews the history of relations between 
Egypt and Sudan and deals briefly with the geopolitical shifts in the Middle East and Horn of Africa 
since 2011. The paper argues that Egypt’s influence on Sudan’s foreign policy and other Nile River 
riparian states has waned due to (1) Egypt’s increased affinity for domestic unrest and waning 
influence in the Middle East; (2) its extended reliance on regional actors for regime security and 
internal stability; and (3) its loss of hydro-hegemony over the Nile basin. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The modern political history of Sudan began with the Turco-Egyptian invasion of 1820 by 
Muhammad Ali Pasha who aspired to build an Egyptian empire. The goals of the invasion were to 
obtain slaves for military conscription, extract gold, and control the Nile Valley and Red Sea trade 
(Sanderson 1963; Robinson 1925). Situated at the confluence of the Blue and White Niles, 
Khartoum, the capital of Sudan, was founded by Muhammad Ali around 1820 as a permanent 
military camp (Hamdan 1960). Egypt’s first period of domination over Sudan ended in 1885 when 
Muhammad Ahmad Ibn Abdullah, who proclaimed himself the Mahdi (Dekmejian and 
Wyszomirski 1972), led a Sudanese Mahdist rebellion to capture Khartoum, overthrew Egyptian 
rule, and established Mahdiyya (1885-98), or the Mahdist State. However, Egypt’s rule over Sudan 
was restored with the Anglo-Egyptian invasion in 1898 that defeated the Mahdist state and declared 
a joint regime known as the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium in 1899. The Condominium rule lasted 
until 1956 when Sudan gained its independence (Daly 2003a). Until then, the control of Sudan 
expanded Egypt’s influence from the shores of the Mediterranean deep into Sub-Saharan Africa.  
Colonization tied Sudan to a purely exploitative relationship with Egypt that regarded Sudan as part 
of an Egyptian homeland. In fact, Egypt under British control regularly demanded of Great Britain 
that Egypt and Sudan should be unified under the “Egyptian crown” (Abushouk 2010: 220). For 
example, on June 28, 1924, the leader of Egypt’s nationalist Wafd Party, Prime Minister Sa‘d 
Zaghlul Pasha, stated in the Egyptian Chamber of Deputies:  
This is our situation in respect to the Sudan: We spend money there, we shed blood there, we 
endure hardships there, and our fathers endured such before us, and we draw life from that river 
which pours forth from the highest reaches of the Sudan. In any case, it is impossible, unless we 
were a lifeless people, that we leave one speck of the Sudan for others (Mills 2014: 11). 
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In other words, a refusal to relinquish its control of Sudan was key to Egypt’s strategic 
development as a geopolitical entity. For Egypt, mastery of the region came from its control of the 
sources of the Nile and Sudan’s resources (Crabitès 1934). As John Waterbury correctly notes, “The 
Egyptian outlook on the Sudan has traditionally been colonialist…backed by its heavy military 
preponderance…, latent feelings of superiority and inferiority still underlie relations between the 
two states” (Waterbury 1979: 11). Egyptian nationalists claimed that Egypt’s rule in Sudan aimed 
at developing Sudanese welfare and advancing its educational and infrastructural capacities. As such, 
Egypt maintained a paternalistic attitude toward Sudan that made it difficult for the two states to 
establish normal relations and genuine political partnership in the early and mid-twenty-first century 
(Powell 2003). Even after its independence, Sudan remained within the sphere of influence of Egypt, 
a regional heavyweight in the Nile Basin, with the power to influence the stability and sometimes 
survival of Sudanese regimes. 
 
 
Egypt-Sudan relations after independence 
 
Although Egypt-Sudan relations in the post-colonial era have mostly been uneasy and at times 
antagonistic, Egypt managed to shape and contain the behavior of Sudan with regard to its position 
on the waters of the Nile. Sudan gained independence on January 1, 1956, and became the first 
independent country in sub-Saharan Africa (Hasabu and Majid 1985; Warburg 2003; Daly 2003b). 
The overthrow of King Faruq of Egypt on July 25, 1952 by army officers, known as the Free Officers 
Movement, and the rapid decline of the British Empire after WWII as a global power made Egypt 
the dominant country in the Nile basin. The British colonial rule favored Egypt with regard to the 
Nile waters as an important agricultural asset because its Suez Canal was vital to Britain’s economy 
and maritime power. Through water agreements, Britain guaranteed Egypt “historical rights” over 
the Nile waters. An agreement between Britain and Ethiopia in 1902 to settle the boundary between 
Abyssinia (former name for Ethiopia) and Sudan, stipulated that Ethiopia must not construct any 
infrastructural projects on the Blue Nile that would limit the flow of the waters without consent from 
Great Britain and Sudan. Another Nile Water Agreement (NWA) in 1929 between Egypt and Great 
Britain (on behalf of the Sudan) allocated 4 billion cubic meters of river waters per annum for Sudan 
and 48 billion cubic meters for Egypt. In other words, the 1929 NWA recognized Egypt’s dominant 
position on the Nile. Crucially, the 1929 agreement awarded Cairo the right to veto any projects 
higher up the Nile beyond its national borders in order to secure the flow of the Nile. It also led to 
the construction of the Jebel Aulia Dam in 1937, south of Khartoum, to store and control water for 
Egypt. The dam was returned to Sudan in 1977 but became obsolete after the completion of the 
Aswan High Dam in 1971 (Yihdego, Rieu-Clarke, and Cascão 2017).   
Soon after they seized power in Egypt and without informing the Sudanese government, the 
Free Officers decided to build the Aswan High Dam, one of the biggest dams in the world, close to 
the border of Sudan. Its reservoir, Lake Nasser, will eventually extend some 150 km into Sudan 
(Negm 2017) and flood Sudanese towns and villages along the Nile. During independence, the 
Republic of the Sudan was a parliamentary democracy. Colonial history and anti-Egyptian popular 
sentiments constituted a form of political capital for the Sudanese ruling elite and standing up to 
Egypt was a source of popular legitimacy. Soon after Sudan’s independence, mistrust and 
resentment between the two states prevailed when the new Sudanese parliamentary government 
challenged Egypt’s domination over the Nile waters. In the pursuit of securing more of the Nile 
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waters, the Sudanese parliament demanded the abrogation of the 1929 NWA, and refused to consent 
to Egypt’s High Dam at Aswan. 
After almost four years of dispute and tension, the Sudanese government surrendered to 
Egypt’s pressure only after the military takeover by pro-Egyptian General Ibrahim Abboud (who 
served in the Egyptian military before independence), which overthrew the anti-Egyptian Umma 
government in 1958. The settlement was included in the 1959 Water Agreement between Egypt and 
the Republic of the Sudan to the exclusion of other riparian states in the Nile basin (Deng 2007). 
The Agreement was met with huge social opposition in Sudan. Abboud, whose rule lasted until 
1964, needed Egyptian support for Sudan’s first military regime at a time of severe economic 
difficulties and intense domestic power struggle. He hoped that good relations with Cairo would 
secure financial assistance from the World Bank for Sudanese hydro-infrastructure projects. Egypt 
also needed a new legal regime that would respond to the demands of the financiers of the High 
Dam (Saleh 2008: 39-41). The 1959 Agreement effectively enforced the provisions of the 1929 
Agreement and granted both states larger quotas of the river flow (with Egypt taking 55.5 billion 
cubic meters and Sudan 18.5 billion cubic meters of the total 84 billion cubic meters, with 10 billion 
lost to evaporation). Crucially the Agreement secured Egypt’s hydro-hegemonic position by 
reinforcing its claim to “natural and historic” rights in the Nile, and constrained and limited Sudan’s 
future demands for more water and irrigation development. In addition, the 1959 Agreement 
sanctioned Egypt to construct the Aswan High Dam and other projects on the Nile, which submerged 
the old Sudanese town of Wadi Halfa and displaced tens of thousands of Egyptian and Sudanese 
Nubians on both sides of the state line (Wiebe 2001: 737). The Aswan High Dam was central to 
Egypt’s progress towards development and economic power, providing energy and regular water 
supply for its agriculture and protecting Egyptians from the dangers of floods and droughts (Shama 
2013: 27). Moreover, this Agreement granted Egypt with the power to monitor the use of the Nile 
water in Sudan and veto any water development projects that would impact the flow of its water 
allocation (Deng 2007). Since then, Sudan has sided with Egypt in issues pertaining to the Nile 
waters, which naturally undermined its capacity to be seen as a neutral actor by upstream states in 
future water disputes.  
Sudan-Egypt relations reached new heights when President Ja’far al-Nimeiri came to power in 
a military coup on May 25, 1969. The Nimeiri regime identified itself as pan-Arab, modeled on 
Nasser’s revolution in Egypt, while Egyptian support helped Nimeiri to consolidate his rule. A 
special relationship flourished under Egypt’s President Anwar Sadat when Sudan and Egypt signed 
an agreement on their political and economic integration in February 1974, followed by a joint 
defense agreement, the strongest between Egypt and any other country (Khālid 2003: 173). This 
agreement was prompted by an unsuccessful coup against Nimeiri, which Libya’s President 
Muammar Gaddafi was accused of backing (Ogunbadejo 1986: 38-39). A stalwart USA ally during 
the Cold War, Sudan under Nimeiri was one of the three countries, along with Oman and Somalia, 
which stood by Sadat after Egypt signed a peace treaty with Israel in 1979. Viewed by Egypt as 
critically important to its interests in the Middle East and Africa, hostility between Libya and Sudan 
stimulated Mubarak to send military forces and advisors to bolster the defenses of Sudan against 
Libya in March 1984 (Simons 1996: 303). Warm relations with Egypt and the US made Sudan the 
second largest recipient of US aid in Africa after Egypt. For many subsequent years, good relations 
with Egypt were essential for Sudan to secure US assistance and avoid regional and international 
isolation. 
 
 Egyptian-Sudanese Relations amidst Changing Geopolitics 
   
           69 
 
    
  
IDE ME Review Vol.7 
©IDE-JETRO 2020 
 
 
The containment of revolutionary Sudan in the 1990s 
 
Egypt-Sudan relations hit a new low after the ascent to power of Brigadier Umar Hasan al-
Bashir, who ousted the civilian government of Sadiq al-Mahdi in a bloodless military coup on June 
30, 1989. The seizure of power by the National Islamic Front (NIF), which referred to itself as the 
Inqaz al-Watani (the National Salvation, a military-Islamist regime), marked a turning point in 
Sudan’s foreign policy, particularly vis-à-vis Egypt, which still had the power to isolate the 
Sudanese regime during the turbulent 1990s and early 2000s. Like previous military generals, Bashir 
(a graduate of the Egyptian military academy) needed Egypt’s support to consolidate his rule and 
quell the opposition. Bashir made his first foreign visit to Egypt, which was the first state to 
recognize his government. Egypt’s support, in particular, was crucial for Bashir during the intense 
civil war that subsequently erupted in Sudan.  
Later, however, the Egyptian leaders discovered that the coup was masterminded by the 
Islamists of the NIF, which evolved into the National Congress Party (NCP). Relations between the 
two states deteriorated when Sudan declared itself to be an Islamic Republic and Bashir’s Islamist 
foreign policy led him to form an alliance with Hasan al-Turabi, who saw the Iranian revolution as 
a model (Burr and Collins 2003). Egypt’s fear of Sudan exporting its Islamist ideology in the region 
coincided with Sudan’s new alliance with revolutionary Iran and a resurgence of the militant Islamic 
Groups (al-Gama‘a al-Islamiyya and al-Jihad) in Egypt during much of the 1990s. The regional 
realignment gave Iran a foothold in Egypt’s southern borders. As Egypt’s tourism industry was 
devastated by militant groups’ attacks on tourists, Cairo watched with alarm as Khartoum imposed 
strict Sharia law on Muslims and Christians alike, hosted Al-Qaeda’s Osama Bin Laden, and 
provided refuge and training to militant Egyptian Islamists, and under the pretext of Jihad, declared 
a brutal war with the south of Sudan (De Waal and Salam 2004). Egypt also accused Sudan of 
supporting the Muslim Brotherhood, the most serious and organized political opposition to Mubarak.  
In 1990, Egypt and Saudi Arabia were likewise alarmed by a Sudan-Libya agreement reached 
between Bashir and Gaddafi (Simons 1996: 277). The Sudan-Iran alliance was strengthened when 
Bashir was internationally isolated for supporting the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, and lost US military 
and financial assistance. Iran became Sudan’s most important ally in the region when the two states 
reached a security pact by which Tehran provided Khartoum with oil, weapons, and financial 
assistance (Tekle 1996: 503-04).  
Meanwhile, Sudan’s relations with neighboring African countries were damaged when 
Ethiopia, Uganda, and Algeria accused Sudan of helping rebels and training militant groups from 
their countries. To counter Iran, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia backed Eritrea in its conflict with Sudan, 
and the anti-Bashir states in the region increased their support to the south Sudan People’s Liberation 
Movement (SPLA) and the National Democratic Alliance (NDA), formed in 1989 by Bashir’s 
opponents, including political parties, trade unions, and some officers of the Sudanese armed forces 
(Hassan 1993). With material aid from the USA and its allies, the SPLA increased its military 
capacity and strengthened its political and military alliance with opposition groups in northern 
Sudan (Haywood 2014: 151-52). Such developments weakened the Bashir regime, and alienated 
Sudan from its Arab and African neighbors, and cut the regime off from the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF), World Bank, and foreign investments (Kevane and Gray 1995: 274). Sudan-Egypt 
relations got palpably worse when a Sudanese-backed militant Islamist group in 1995 attempted to 
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assassinate the then Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak as the latter attended an African summit in 
Addis Ababa. Egypt accused the Sudanese leader Hassan al-Turabi while Ethiopia severed 
diplomatic relations with Sudan. Egypt managed to have the United Nations Security Council 
impose sanctions on Sudan while the USA added the country to its list of State Sponsors of 
Terrorism (to date) (Woodward 2016: 30-31). In 1998, the USA bombed the Shifa pharmaceutical 
factory in Khartoum in response to al-Qaeda’s dual attacks two weeks earlier on US embassies in 
Tanzania and Kenya. Mubarak endorsed the US claims that Sudan was using the factory for 
manufacturing chemical weapons, and accused the Bashir regime of harboring terrorists trying to 
topple the Egyptian government (Associated Press, 30 September 1998). 
Egypt’s material and diplomatic powers succeeded in containing Sudan throughout the 1990s. 
When the tension between Egypt and Sudan led to a flare-up of an older border dispute, Egypt 
showed its readiness to use military force. In 1992, a Canadian oil company received a concession 
from Sudan to conduct oil exploration in the “Hala’ib Triangle” region, an area disputed by Sudan 
and Egypt. Cairo responded swiftly by deploying its troops to annex the area (Barltrop 2011: 115). 
Sudan complained to the United Nations Security Council but failed to restore its sovereignty over 
the region.  
During the 1990s, Egypt kept the Sudanese regime isolated regionally and internationally, 
politically and economically. Egypt also undermined regime security in Khartoum by supporting 
the Sudanese opposition. In the short run Egypt succeeded in containing Sudan. Fearing Egypt’s 
military response, Sudan failed to implement its threat of using the Nile water flow as a weapon 
against Egypt (Adar and Check 2011: 52). As a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council, 
Egypt succeeded from January to April 1996 to have the Security Council require Sudan to extradite 
suspects in the attempted assassination of Hosni Mubarak, impose travel and diplomatic sanctions 
on the Bashir regime and members of the Sudanese armed forces, and later impose an air embargo 
on Sudan Airways, which shut Sudan off from airline manufacturing industries (Mikhail 2008: 99-
100).  
Bashir realized that Sudan had not gained economic and material benefits from its alliance with 
Iran and other anti-Egyptian states. The only way for Khartoum to manage its deteriorating economy 
and status as an international ‘pariah’ after years of isolation was to mend its relations with Egypt. 
Only then could Bashir de-escalate its conflict with the USA and secure funds from the wealthy 
Gulf states. In order to seek relief from Egypt’s increasing regional and international pressure, 
Bashir had to reduce his hostility towards Mubarak. Furthermore, the Bashir regime believed that 
Egypt could use its strong ties with the USA to remove Sudan from the USA’s list of terror states. 
Relations with Egypt improved in 1999, when Khartoum transferred to Cairo a suspect involved in 
the attempted assassination of Mubarak. To win the support of Egypt and the USA, Bashir cut ties 
with Hassan al-Turabi, removed him as the secretary general of the ruling party, and later arrested 
him. The removal of al-Turabi was also essential to holding peace talks with the SPLM/A that later 
led to the peace process in Kenya (De Waal 2004).  
Egypt rallied the Gulf Arab states and other African countries behind Bashir’s new alignments. 
While they previously supported rebels in Sudan, now Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Uganda tried to make 
peace with Sudan because they were themselves embroiled in wars. Sudan re-established contact 
with the USA, and the latter unfroze the assets of Salah Idris, the owner of the Shifa pharmaceutical 
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factory. 1In September 2001, with Egyptian support, the UN Security Council voted to lift its 
sanctions on Sudan.2 
As discussed above, for decades, Egypt could exert considerable influence on Sudan’s post-
independent political developments because the former had various kinds of power. Egypt had the 
largest military in the Middle East and the Nile basin. Furthermore, Egypt has a history of 
centralized rule that allowed for state institutionalization and a high degree of national identity and 
social homogeneity, unlike Sudan, which failed to maintain a centralized post-colonial state with a 
long history of civil wars (Elnur 2009). Their superior force, coercive diplomacy, and strong 
relations with world powers enabled the Egyptian elites to influence Sudan’s internal and external 
politics, and effectively kept Sudan as an important and compliant part of Egypt’s sphere of 
influence. Yet Egypt will see its regional influence soon diminish due to domestic and geopolitical 
alignments in the Middle East and the Horn of Africa. Moreover, Egypt’s security approach to Sudan 
will, in the long run, make it difficult for Cairo to form meaningful strategic positions with 
Khartoum on the Nile waters. 
 
 
The decline of Egypt’s hegemony 
 
Egypt’s hegemony has declined, partly because of domestic, political, ideological, 
and economic transformation. Changes in the balance of power in the Middle East, 
growing asymmetry in power relations in the Nile basin, and great power competition 
in the Horn of Africa has had its toll on Egypt’s stature as the principal regional actor. 
Two developments have been especially important in this regard.  
First, with the death of Gamal Abdel Nasser in 1970, Egypt departed from pan-
African ideas of liberation, regardless of how paternalistic Egypt had been toward the 
African countries. Egypt under Nasser offered refuge to African exiles, as well as 
logistics and political support for Africa’s fighters (Akinsanya 1976). By supporting 
nationalist movements in Africa during the 1950s and 60s, Egypt tried to expand its 
anti-imperialist front against the British and gain influence in the then newly 
independent African states. However, Egypt lost its leadership position in the Arab 
world after its humiliating defeat in the 1967 war against Israel. As Egypt became the 
poorest Arab state (by per capita income), it ceased to be a model for development in 
Africa. As a result, Egypt’s ideational power also dwindled. Under Anwar Sadat (1970-
81), Egypt shifted toward the West and thereby received aid from the USA, obtained 
material benefits for his regime and military, and gained access to international 
financial institutions. Egypt made peace with Israel and broke ties with the Arab and 
the African worlds. In fact, Sadat dissolved the African Affairs Bureau and supported 
the US-backed movements in Africa. Egypt’s projection of power ended with its 
economic collapse and increasing dependency on the Gulf states, besides other 
international events, which took their toll. The end of the Cold War marginalized 
Africa’s position. Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait divided the Arab world between those who 
                                                        
1  “US admits Sudan bombing mistake,” Independent, May 4,1999: https://www.independent.co.uk/news/us-
admits-sudan-bombing-mistake-1091397.html (accessed June 11, 2018). 
2 “Security Council Lifts Sanctions against Sudan,” United Nations, September 28, 2001:  
https://www.un.org/press/en/2001/sc7157.doc.htm (accessed June 13, 2018). 
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supported the US-led campaign to liberate Kuwait and those who rejected it. Egypt 
increasingly relied on its coercive diplomacy as a foreign policy tool to get the Nile 
basin states into compliance for fear that upstream states might tamper with the Nile’s 
water. Sadat is remembered for threatening to use military force against Ethiopia in 
1978 when he stated:  
(A) ny action that would endanger the waters of the Blue Nile will be faced 
with a firm reaction on the part of Egypt, even if that action should lead to 
war. As the Nile waters issue is one of life and death for my people, I feel 
I must urge the United States to speed up the delivery of the promised 
military aid so that Egypt might not be caught napping (Kendie 1999: 141). 
 
After Sadat, Mubarak was preoccupied with maintaining regime security and his 
hold on power (Shama 2013). Egypt showed little enthusiasm for the African Union 
and viewed Africa through a security prism, especially after the Islamists took power 
in Sudan and the attempted assassination of Mubarak in Ethiopia in 1995. Mubarak 
stopped attending African summits (with the exception of Abuja in 2005) (Landsberg 
and Van Wyk 2012: 245). However, during those summits, Ethiopia mobilized the Nile 
basin countries over the need to review the 1929 and 1959 Nile water agreements. 
Lacking foreign policy agenda and occupied with grooming his son to succeed him, 
Mubarak relied on his intelligence services in his relations with African states. He 
showed little interest in economic integration with African countries, and the Nile basin 
states in particular (Tawfik 2016). With its diminished influence, Egypt had barely any 
role in the negotiations that led to the independence of South Sudan in July 2011. Indeed, 
South Sudan’s secession marked the end of Egypt’s influence in Sudanese politics.  
Second, a new order emerged in the Nile basin based on power relations between 
upstream and downstream states. Nile basin states increased their cooperation while 
Egypt refused to join new initiatives regarding the distribution and utilization of the 
Nile waters. The result was an enhancement of power of the upstream countries. The 
Nile basin Cooperative Framework Agreement (CFA), signed in 2010 by Uganda, 
Ethiopia, Rwanda, Tanzania, Kenya, and Burundi, enhanced the bargaining power of 
the upstream states, granting them autonomy in deciding Nile projects without prior 
consent from Egypt (Salman 2013).  
In response, Egypt froze its membership in the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) that was 
formed in 1999 to develop the river in a cooperative manner. The NBI was the first 
cooperative agreement that included all riparian states, including Ethiopia and Egypt. 
By pulling out of the NBI, Egypt preempted the possibility of cooperation or negotiation 
with Ethiopia, which supplies up to 80 percent of the Nile waters annually. Egypt did 
not reach any cooperative agreement with the river basin states; nor did it try to find an 
alternative agreement to the cooperative framework established by other riparian states. 
Egypt’s apprehension over losing its former veto power lies behind its reluctance to 
participate in new water treaties. Egypt appears oblivious to the passage of time and the 
changes in the power structure of the region since the 1929 and 1959 agreements with 
Sudan allowed it to be the hegemon of the Nile basin. Facing a changed balance of 
power, Egypt has lost its bargaining power and its past capacity to influence other 
riparian states.  
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Meanwhile, the upstream riparian states’ increased material power, through their 
recent economic and political ascendency, has facilitated their higher utilization of the 
Nile waters. They have raised their ideational power through different arguments. They 
asserted their right to water utilization for development (Egypt’s rationale for building 
the Aswan High Dam) of which they were deprived under restrictive colonial 
agreements. They stressed the importance of the Nile for famine prevention. 
Additionally, they held out better prospects for peace and regional integration through 
hydropower projects that would bring electricity and prosperity to millions of Africans 
in the river basin and beyond. Egypt finds itself on the defensive, bereft of effective 
discursive responses. 
 
 
Egypt-Sudan relations after the January 25 uprising 
 
Egypt-Sudan relations after the Arab uprising of 2010-11 were affected by shifting regional 
dynamics in the Middle East and the Horn of Africa, and the ways in which the domestic politics of 
each country shaped its foreign policy. The fall of Mubarak presented Egyptian policy makers with 
an opportunity to reorient Egypt’s relations with its southern neighbors in the Nile basin. However, 
the ensuing chaos exposed a severe weakness in the power structure of the Egyptian state. A period 
of severe political and economic volatility made Egypt more vulnerable to external intervention and 
dependent on its Gulf allies for the survival and security of the ruling elites. Thus, Egypt was limited 
in its abilities to be involved in Arab affairs as widespread turmoil in MENA intensified competition 
among regional rivals, particularly, Saudi Arabia and UAE, on the one hand, and Qatar and Turkey, 
on the other.   
In addition, Mubarak was overthrown as President Barack Obama’s administration announced 
its intention to reorient US grand strategy away from the Middle East and in the direction of East 
Asia (dubbed “Pivot to Asia”) to rebalance its relationship with China. The USA’s influence in the 
Middle East was already in retreat as was shown by the withdrawal of its troops from Iraq, which 
was completed in December 2011, and the signing of a nuclear deal with Iran (formally known as
  the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action) in July 2015. Besides, the Egyptian military and 
police forces had, for more than eight years, failed to eliminate a Sinai Peninsula insurgency that 
was rooted in deprivation and local grievances (Aziz 2017). As a result, an insecure leadership 
looked inwards and eroded Egypt’s stature as a major regional power.  
Almost two weeks after Mubarak’s fall, Burundi joined the Nile basin pact, which Egypt 
opposed, that planned to build two hydro-electric dams at Burundi’s borders with Rwanda and 
Congo (Reuters March 2, 2011). The most serious threat to Egypt happened when Ethiopia 
announced plans in April 2011 to build the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), the largest 
hydroelectric power project in Africa, just 40 kilometers from its border with Sudan. The dam is 
expected to generate 5,000 to 6,000 megawatts, three times more than the capacity of Egypt’s High 
Dam. Ethiopia had been preparing to construct a major dam for many years. Perhaps the 
announcement of the GERD two months after Mubarak’s fall and three months before South 
Sudan’s independence, indicated that Ethiopia thought Egypt’s convulsions heralded a huge 
regional change and Ethiopia could build its dam without consulting Sudan or Egypt. In a leaked 
audio recording, Mubarak had once said of GERD, “I had then warplanes which made me able to 
hit the dam and destroy it in one strike.” But when he was asked if that was still possible, he replied, 
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“not any more, you hit a dam now, you get in trouble with all Africans.” He added that “the whole 
world doesn’t take us seriously any more. All the world knows we have become a weak nation. 
Although we held a lot of weight previously.”3 
Despite its problems of mass poverty, internal instability, and persistent food insecurity that 
threaten to fuel social unrest, Ethiopia has attained rapid economic growth and expanded 
employment in agriculture, services, and export-led industries. Ethiopia has double-digit annual 
GDP growth (although the figure is disputed) and major foreign investment in various fields 
(Hagmann and Abbink 2011). Just as the Egyptians placed their hopes in the Aswan High Dam in 
the 1960s, similarly the Ethiopians, with nearly 70 percent of the population lacking access to 
electricity,4 now saw the GERD as vital to the continued economic transformation and political 
stability. 
 
 
Sudan: coping with changing geopolitics 
 
In the aftermath of Mubarak’s fall in February 2011, Sudan increasingly aligned its views with 
Ethiopia with regard to the Nile waters. In addition to its rising inflation and depreciating currency, 
the Sudanese economy received an immediate shock when it lost much of its oil revenues after 
South Sudan’s secession in July 2011. During the previous decade, oil production in the south made 
Sudan one of Africa’s fastest growing economies. Although South Sudan’s secession ended decades 
of civil war, it undermined the Bashir regime’s ability to retain his ruling coalition by deploying 
state resources. To offset the loss of oil revenues, Sudan needed more than ever to raise productivity 
in agriculture, its only viable economic sector, and exploit other export possibilities, notably 
livestock. To do so, Sudan needs both a regular flow of water and an energy supply that would 
improve harvests throughout the year and safeguard long-term food security.  
From GERD, Sudan hopes to gain cheap electricity and stable levels of water flow. This would 
alleviate the threat of annual floods and improve drought control, both vital to the development of 
Sudan’s agriculture, and its continued relations with the Gulf states.  
In addition, in the wake of the 2007-08 economic and global food crisis, the Arab Gulf states 
searched for ways to reduce their vulnerability to shocks in the global food trade. They set up plans 
of foreign agro-investments and major land deals to develop Sudan and other southern neighboring 
countries as a “breadbasket” of the Gulf region (Lippman 2010; Woertz 2013). By the extensive use 
of its water and land resources, Sudan seeks massive agricultural projects in partnership with the 
Gulf Arab capital (Verhoeven 2012). Sudan now ranks first in Arab Gulf investment in agricultural 
projects and animal-based industries. The Gulf states’ investments in Sudan’s agriculture gave the 
latter confidence to chart its Nile basin policy away from Egypt’s concerns. Sovereign funds of Gulf 
countries or collective funds like the Islamic Development Bank have contributed greatly to those 
investments. Arab Gulf countries supported major hydraulic projects and food companies in Sudan 
like the Merowe Dam in 2009, the Roseries Dam in 2013, and the Kenana Sugar Company, a joint 
                                                        
3  “Mubarak: No One Takes Egypt Seriously Anymore,” Middle East Monitor, June 20, 2017:  
https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20170620-mubarak-no-one-takes-egypt-seriously-any-more/ (accessed March 
20, 2018). 
4  “Ethiopia’s Transformational Approach to Universal Electrification,” The World Bank, March 8, 2018:  
https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2018/03/08/ethiopias-transformational-approach-to-universal-
electrification (accessed December 11, 2019). 
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venture between the Sudanese government, the Kuwait government, and other state and corporate 
partners.  
Such investments have caused tension between Egypt on the one hand, and Ethiopia and Sudan 
on the other. The latter two states assert their right to exploit the Nile waters to boost agricultural 
production and strengthen ties with Arab oil producers. The changed balance of power, partly caused 
by the rising interests of the Gulf states in the Nile basin, favors Ethiopia and Sudan. In fact, the 
Saudis supported Sudan and Ethiopia on GERD when high-level Saudi officials visited the dam in 
December 2016. The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) has even discussed importing power 
produced by GERD to diversify their energy sources and save their petroleum for export.5 The lack 
of regional institutions and agreements that regulate the utilization of the Nile waters between 
riparian states has made it easy for the Gulf states to expand their influence in the basin through 
bilateral deals. All this has accorded Sudanese and Ethiopian leaders greater leverage and bargaining 
power vis-à-vis Egypt in their plans to build more hydroelectric stations on the Nile.  
The Gulf investment schemes are not transforming African economies because their focus is 
not on industry, but rather, on water, land, energy, and other natural resources. This means that the 
Nile basin is under mounting pressure due to the increasing number of actors interested in utilizing 
its waters. Thus, Egypt has to contend not only with its southern neighbors but with new powerful 
actors in the Middle East and the Horn of Africa, mainly Saudi Arabia and the UAE, and a region 
increasingly fractured by regional rivalries. Saudi Arabia and the UAE have steadily used their 
political and financial clout to secure their interests in the Red Sea and headwaters of the Nile River, 
both vital to Egypt’s national security. The rise of Saudi Arabia and the UAE’s leadership role in 
African-Arab joint actions were evident when, like Sudan, Djibouti and Somalia broke off ties with 
Iran in 2016 after the execution of the Shia cleric in Saudi Arabia and the resultant attack by 
protesters on the Saudi Embassy in Tehran (Aman 2017). Moreover, the Gulf Crisis of June 2017, 
which pitted pro-Brotherhood Qatar against Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrain, and Egypt, also affected 
Sub-Saharan Africa, which was pressured to take sides in the conflict. Interestingly, Sudan and 
Ethiopia benefited from the crisis by staying neutral and continued to receive investments from both 
Qatar and other GCC states. Since the Arab Spring, Sudan has signed a number of defense and 
economic agreements and deployed thousands of Sudanese troops to join the Saudi-led war in 
Yemen. On the other hand, having to fight militancy in Sinai and on its western border with Libya, 
and recalling its costly casualties during its involvement in Yemen in 1962-66, Egypt has limited its 
participation in the current war on Yemen to the deployment of air forces and naval ships. Instead, 
in 2016, Egypt gave up its sovereignty over the two strategically located islands in the Red Sea, 
Tinar and Sanafir, to Saudi Arabia in apparent gratitude for the latter’s support for Sisi’s coup 
against Morsi and for future Saudi investments. Soon after that, Sudan called on Egypt to negotiate 
the status of two disputed port cities, Halaib and Shalateen, located at the Egypt-Sudan border on 
the Red Sea’s African coast, or to refer their dispute to the International Court of Arbitration. Sudan 
claims that it holds documents that prove its sovereignty over the two cities.6 
                                                        
5 “Saudi Arabia eyes Ethiopian hydropower link to cut reliance on oil and gas,” Climate Home News, September 
27, 2018: 
 https://www.climatechangenews.com/2018/09/27/saudi-arabia-eyes-ethiopian-hydropower-link-cut-reliance-oil-
gas/ (accessed August 10, 2018). 
6  “Sudan complains to UN over Egypt holding elections in Halaib triangle,” Egypt Independent, April 19, 2018: 
https://egyptindependent.com/sudan-complains-un-egypt-holding-elections-halaib-triangle/ (accessed January 5, 
2019). 
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Egypt has also failed to influence Sudan’s foreign policy, including its strong alliance with 
Qatar and Turkey, two of Egypt’s regional enemies that are linked by their support of the Muslim 
Brotherhood movement in Egypt and the region. Egypt was alarmed when Sudan signed a 99-year 
lease of Suakin Island to Turkey, a key port in the Red Sea. The lease allows Turkey, which already 
has military bases in Somalia and Qatar, to enhance its strategic influence in the Red Sea area and 
develop military cooperation between the two states. These military bases give Turkey leverage 
over the freedom of navigation in the Red Sea and magnify Cairo’s perception of Turkish foreign 
policy as a threat to Egyptian national security. During the Qatar-Gulf Crisis of June 5, 2017, Turkey 
came to the rescue of Qatar by establishing a humanitarian air bridge and sending more troops to its 
military base in Doha. The swift Turkish response to this crisis has solidified its relationship with 
Qatar and highlighted Turkey’s resurgence in the Middle East. Egypt sees Qatar, Turkey, and Sudan 
as pro-Muslim Brotherhood states and views their alliance as a security threat. For Turkey, Sudan 
has a very strategic location, offers a market for its exports and has fertile land that Turkey can use. 
Besides security cooperation, Turkey and Sudan set up a joint agricultural and livestock company 
in Khartoum in November 2018. The company’s presence adds to Turkey’s regional influence as 
Sudan is an important gateway to areas in Central Africa.  
In addition, President Erdogan of Turkey wants to curb the influence of Fethullah Gulen 
movement in Africa, which is accused by Ankara of orchestrating the military coup in Turkey on 
July 15, 2016. 7 To some extent, Turkey relieves the Sudanese regime from relying too heavily on 
its unpredictable allies in the Gulf and represents a valuable counterpoint to Egypt. Cairo has 
repeatedly accused Sudan of harboring Muslim Brotherhood members who escaped from Egypt 
after the overthrow of Muhammad Morsi by the Egyptian military in July 2013. Tensions arose 
when Sudan banned the import of agricultural and animal products from Egypt in May 2017 and 
accused Cairo of supporting rebels to topple the government in Sudan (Reuters May 30, 2017). 
Being respectively embroiled in the war in Yemen and an insurgency in the Sinai have prevented 
Saudi Arabia and Egypt from confronting the emerging alliance between Sudan and Turkey. For 
that matter, Egypt needs Sudan to preserve its share of the Nile waters and cannot afford a 
deterioration in their relations. Innumerable factors, therefore, have eroded Egypt’s domination of 
the Nile and its southern neighbor. The geopolitical transformations in the Middle East and the Horn 
of Africa have opened new alliance-building options for Sudan and relieved its leadership from 
being locked into its water agreements with Egypt. Finally, Sudan’s potential for irrigation 
expansion has required it to play a more active role in the Nile basin and an alliance with Ethiopia 
to meet its export and commercial ambitions. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
This paper has reviewed the history of Egypt-Sudan relations in the Nile basin. It has also 
examined the domestic and regional dynamics that have led Egypt to lose Sudan to Ethiopia with 
regard to the Nile waters. Sudan’s importance stems from the fact that it has been the only country 
in the Nile basin that has a water agreement allocation with Egypt. Egypt’s present geopolitical 
position in the Middle East and Africa reflects its harsh political and economic realities. Today, its 
                                                        
7 “Sudan hands over Gulen-linked schools to Turkish gov’t,” Sudan Tribune, May 14, 2017: 
 http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article62455 (accessed January 2, 2018). 
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internal political and economic turmoil and the expanded influence of the Gulf states leave Egypt 
with little influence over a region torn by searing crises in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen. Egypt is highly 
dependent on external aid and funding to stay economically afloat and politically stable. Unable to 
match the influence of Saudi Arabia and the UAE in the region, the post-Mubarak regimes in Egypt 
have sought regional opportunities to address domestic economic grievances and crush domestic 
opponents.  
As a midstream country, post- “Arab Spring” Sudan has been interestingly more adept in 
playing different sides of the political divides in the region. Crucially, the demise of Egypt as a 
regional hegemon and the rising power of upstream states allowed Sudan to break ranks with Egypt 
in supporting its water agreements. Without Sudan, it is extremely hard for Egypt to rely on the 
1929 and 1959 agreements to secure the flow of the Nile waters. Ethiopia has been able to persuade 
Sudan that the GERD will benefit Sudan and bring a stable inflow of Nile waters throughout the 
year. Sudan’s defection leaves Egypt isolated and vulnerable to shifting balance of power in the Nile 
basin. While Ethiopia has succeeded in drawing support from upstream riparian states for its hydro 
power projects, Egypt, despite being the Chair of the African Union, has reached out to the United 
States in 2019 to seek support for its talks with Ethiopia over the GERD. Nabil Abdel Fattah, an 
Egyptian political analyst and researcher in Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies, 
correctly noted that “our diplomatic capacities in Africa have been shrinking for decades; we 
depended on the United States and Europe. We neglected the major changes taking place on the 
continent and had no scholars, diplomats or military personnel who really knew Ethiopia. We have 
even proved incapable of resolving this impasse by activating the Coptic networks when the 
churches of both countries are closely connected.”8 Egypt’s failure to formulate new national and 
regional strategies to adequately address the current shifting geopolitical landscape in the Nile basin 
will only grant Ethiopia greater leverage of regional influence and put the brakes on Egypt’s control 
of the Nile River as more dams are being built, populations are growing, and climate is changing. 
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